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What makes a speech act a speech act? Which are its necessary and 
sufficient conditions? I claim in this paper that we cannot find an answer to 
those questions in Austin’s doctrine of the infelicities, since some 
infelicities take place in fully committing speech acts, whereas others 
prevent the utterance from being considered as a speech act at all. With this 
qualification in mind, I argue against the idea that intentions—considered as 
mental states accomplishing a causal role in the performance of the act—
should be considered among the necessary conditions of speech acts. I 
would thus like to deny a merely ‘symptomatic’ account of intentions, 
according to which we could never make anything but fallible hypotheses 
about the effective occurrence of any speech act. I propose an alternative 
‘criterial’ account of the role of intentions in speech acts theory, and analyse 
Austin’s and Searle’s approaches in the light of this Wittgensteinian 
concept. Whether we consider, with Austin, that speech acts ‘imply’ mental 
states or, with Searle, that they ‘express’ them, we could only make sense of 
this idea if we considered utterances as criteria for intentions, and not as 
alleged behavioural effects of hidden mental causes. 
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1. Internalism and externalism in speech acts theory: what 
makes a speech act a speech act 
 
Robert M. Harnish (2009) has recently tried to classify current speech acts theories 
between internalist and externalist accounts, considering the relative importance 
given by each author to the mental states of speakers and hearers in the first case, 
or to the conditions of the world surrounding them in the second1. Despite 
Harnish’s proficient analysis, the result is disconcerting, perhaps because he 
introduces between the allegedly internalist and externalist positions an 
intermediate ‘mixed’ category where, in the end, everybody seems to fit more 
comfortably. It is intuitively true that, as he points out, approaches inspired by 
Austin (1962)—in that they try to explain the workings of speech acts by making 
conventions, rules, and norms explicit—tend to be more akin to postulate external 
conditions2; whereas those who are inspired by Grice (1957)—assuming an 
approach based on the inferential attribution of intentions to the speaker—tend to 
make a more constant use of belief-desire psychology, and are thus more prone to 
internalism. However, as Harnish himself notices, an author like Alston (2000), 
who is a clear descendent of Austin, seems to be quite internalist; and we find an 
important inclination to externalism even among new Gricean theoreticians, when 
they make use of a “Derivative Externalism” in their account of truth (Harnish 
2009: 19-20).  
The problem is that the relative weight of internal and external conditions 
within a theory is not something simple to evaluate, and there does not seem to be 
good reasons to catalogue some theories as ‘mixed’ and others as ‘internalists’ if 
the latter are also ‘mixed’, since they do not deny the existence of external 
requirements. On the other side, once the alleged externalism of Sbisà (2002) is 
discarded by Harnish as a sort of impure position (in a reading that does not seem 
to be as sympathetic as one could have expected), the externalist extreme of the 
range seems to be occupied by Gazdar (1981) alone—with the hesitant suggestion 
that Millikan (2005) might accompany him there. However, pace Harnish, Gazdar 
does not seem to be particularly externalist when he claims that “A speech act is a 
function from contexts into contexts” (1981: 68). His analysis of the logical 
structure of speech acts theory could be assumed by an internalist, as far as mental 
                                                
1 A different way of expressing a similar distinction can be found in Sbisà (2002), where she 
distinguishes between authors who tend to understand context in terms of “objective 
conditions” and those who are more predisposed to introduce “cognitive” ones.  
2 Sbisà (2002), (2009); or Moati (2009) are some recent examples. 
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states have not been banned from the notion of context—and I have not found in 
Gazdar (1981) any attempt to do this. 
In this way, nobody seems to fit properly either in the internalist or in the 
externalist side of Harnish’s arrangement, and the ‘mixed’ category gets 
overcrowded. For this reason, I would say that the sharp demarcation line ought to 
be drawn between those who do include mental states as strictly necessary 
conditions for the performance of speech acts—no matter how tiny their role is in 
the theory—and those who do not, and explicitly exclude them from the set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that any utterance has to accomplish in order to 
be considered as a speech act3. Such a demarcation would leave no room for mixed 
positions, since it is not a matter of relative weight, but of presence or absence of 
such kind of internal or cognitive requirements.  
My intention here is to propose the following question as the crucial one: are 
unintentional speech acts a kind of speech act or, in so far as they have not been 
intended actions, they are no speech acts at all? The answer to our problem will 
depend on what we mean by “unintentional”. And this will in turn depend on what 
we mean by “intentional” or “intended” and “intention”. Most speech act theorists 
understand these terms in the following way: an act is “intended” if it is caused by 
an “intention”, and an “intention” is a mental state causally efficacious in 
behaviour. An “unintentional” act would be a piece of behaviour that would not 
have been directly caused by any “intention”. An effect that was not expected by 
the agent—and was only indirectly caused by a different intention of her—would 
not be an intended action, even if the act itself can be described as intended from a 
different perspective.4 Although I do not think that this is the best way to 
understand intentions, in what follows I will assume this conception, since it seems 
to be the dominant one among speech acts theoreticians. Thus, if we assume 
intentions as mental causally efficacious states, the question would thus be: are 
those states among the necessary and sufficient conditions of a speech act? Or, in 
                                                
3 Most authors in the tradition of Grice and Strawson talk about “utterances” in general as 
modifications of the physical environment designed by a communicator to be perceived by 
an audience and used as evidence of the communicator's intentions. Other authors have 
preferred the term “stimulus”, which does not imply such a bias to linguistic cases of 
intended communication (Sperber and Wilson 1986:29). I will preserve the original term, 
but I do not mean by using it that the act must be intentionally performed. In my view, 
utterances can be done with no intention, and thus with no communicative intention, whether 
linguistic or not. 
4 This would assume two of the main theses of Davidson (1982) on actions: first, that we can 
quantify over events; and second, that actions can only be intentional under particular 
descriptions. 
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other terms: by asserting that a speech act took place, are we eo ipso asserting that 
it is the case that speaker was in quite specific mental states, and that those states 
have been the cause of her actions? 
 
 
2. A possible confusion arising from Austin’s doctrine of the in-
felicities 
 
Austin’s (1962) attempt to give an account of performatives was undeniably 
inspiring: a great example of a philosopher struggling to find his own way in an 
exciting new field of conceptual analysis. However, his initial effort, in the terms 
he originally sketched it, could lead to confusion. The reason is that he fails to 
make clear enough the really crucial distinction: the one between what is a 
performative and what is not. This line might be blurred and vague itself and, if 
this were the case, we should not demand from the analysis a level of exactitude 
that would be alien to its object. However, whether vague or not, that line ought 
not to be identified with the famous one initially traced by Austin between 
felicitous and infelicitous performatives. The reason is very simple: some 
infelicitous performatives are performatives, whereas some others are not. Austin 
himself was perfectly aware of this, but he induced to mistake when he described 
unhappy performatives in general as different kinds of performatives, when in fact 
most of them are not performatives at all. Austin’s approach was tentative, and, at 
least at that initial point, his aim was just to describe the phenomenon in question, 
rather than to give an explanation of it, not to say a theory. But the way he 
approached his subject might have led some of his readers to this kind of 
conceptual mess.  
Let me make this clear with two examples. First: after wandering thirsty in the 
dessert I think that I see an oasis, just to realise later that it was not an oasis at all, 
but just a mirage. Although it would make sense to say that ‘this one’ was a false 
oasis, a false oasis is not a kind of oasis: it is not an oasis at all. “False” is not 
working here as a specification of the kind of oasis that I saw. It would make no 
sense trying to make a list with all the oases that there are in the world, whether 
they are real or false: such a category would not be correctly defined since, in a 
way, there are no false oases, but only situations under which somebody deceitfully 
takes something as an oasis. In contrast to this, it would be perfectly sensible to 
make a list of all the real oasis there are in the word, whether they are “weird” or 
not: we would just make our requirements less strict. In contrast to “weird”, “false” 
is not an adjective for that oasis—since there is no such oasis—but only the effect 
of a process of categorization: it shows that the process initially failed, or could 
have failed at a particular moment.  
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A similar argument would invalidate any pretention to build, for instance, a list 
with all the false medical doctors that are there in the world. We would have to 
include in it not only anybody who ever consciously pretended to be a medical 
doctor but also those cases in which somebody could ever be deceived into taking 
someone else as such: from fictional characters to quite common 
misunderstandings, like the pharmacist wearing a white coat that is incorrectly 
taken for a physician, or the anthropologist that, after being introduced as a 
“Doctor”, is mistakenly considered by somebody as a medical doctor.  
Those examples show that we cannot build a category of all Ps, disregarding if 
they are real or false ones. And it would be equally meaningless to build a category 
with all the false Ps. Both categories would be wrongly defined, and assuming 
them would commit us to look for so confusing things as really false oases, or 
really false medical doctors. 
Although he did not make this mistake himself, Austin’s original intention to 
approach performatives by describing the conditions that could be wrong in their 
performance induces the reader to it. An inattentive reading of Austin’s work could 
construct him as trying to guess which are the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for something to be a performative tout court, whether a felicitous or an 
infelicitous one. But, among the infelicities that he describes, those he called 
“misfires” (caused by bad invocations or executions of the convention) are not 
performatives at all. They are, in Austin’s own words, “purported or empty”, and 
thus “void or without effect” (1962: 16). If we talk about those cases as 
“performatives”, it must be in the same sense we call a false oasis an “oasis”: they 
are not tokens that fall under the type of performatives; it is just a way of speaking 
about those cases that might induce to failures in the process of categorization. In 
contrast to this, what Austin called “abuses” (insincerities or inconsistencies with 
further actions), do give rise to a legitimate kind of performative acts: those whose 
“professed or hollow” character does not prevent them from being fully 
committing speech acts, although they might not be “implemented” or 
“consummated”.5 Considering all of them as different kinds of performatives is 
somehow like trying to make a category of all oases or all medical doctors, 
disregarding if they are real or false ones.  
The situation becomes even more confusing when Austin makes reference to a 
bunch of other situations that affect the act, but he does not make clear if they 
could invalidate it (1962: 21-5). Not trying to be exhaustive or systematic, he talks 
                                                
5 In Bach and Harnish’s (1979, 55-7) jargon, “felicity” conditions are not “success” 
conditions: the act is defective in cases where felicity conditions are not accomplished, but it 
might be successfully performed nevertheless. 
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about “extenuating circumstances” (acts done under duress, by accident, owing to 
mistake or unintentionally), “other kinds of ill which infect all utterances” (the 
possibility of being said on stage, in a poem, or in soliloquy), and “a sort of 
‘infelicity’ […] arising out of ‘misunderstanding’” (when the utterance was not 
properly heard or grasped). It is not clear which of those additional “ills” would 
turn the utterance into a ‘weird’ or impure performative, and which of them would 
force us to exclude the case from the category at all. But one point seems to be 
plain: taking them all—misinvocations, insincerities, accidents, soliloquies, 
misunderstandings, and so on—as different species inside the category of 
“performative” would be like saying that the impostor, the fictional character, the 
pharmacist and the anthropology professor, together with the real medical doctor, 
are all tokens of the same type of “medical doctors”, although some of them are 
real, and some of them are not. And this would be a conceptual mess. 
Austin abandoned his initial study of performatives for the broader notion of 
speech acts, which is the one I am here interested in. But the kind of mistake 
induced by his initial attempt could be easily extended to this second approach, 
since most of the infelicities that affect performative utterances can also afect 
speech acts in general.6  
Returning to the debate on internalism and externalism in speech acts theory, 
and to the question I proposed in the preceding section, the problem now is which 
of those ills affect the necessary and sufficient conditions of speech acts up to the 
point that the speech act would not even take place. I would like to focus on one 
particular group of infelicities: some of those that Austin classified as “extenuating 
circumstances”—acts done by accident, owing to mistake or unintentionally—and 
I will refer to them in general as “unintentional speech acts”. Returning thus to the 
crucial question, I would like to ask if unintended speech acts are a kind of speech 
act, or if they are not speech acts at all. In other words: is “unintentional” here 
working as an adjective that indicates the kind of speech act that took place, or 
does it mean that, as far as it was not intended, the speech act did not take place at 
                                                
6 See Sbisà (2009:46). The famous exchange between Searle (1989) and Bach and Harnish 
(1992) is burdened with the performative/assertive distinction. Despite their important 
differences, they all seem to be wondering how is it possible to guarantee the performative 
force of utterances, beyond their merely assertive aspect. In so doing, they preserve assertion 
as pragmatically unproblematic, and they only find a challenge in the performative side of 
the utterance. Following Austin in this, I am inclined to consider assertions as just one more 
kind of speech act, and not as something besides or beyond the pragmatic character of 
speech acts. It is not clear for me why Searle, who had followed Austin in overcoming his 
original distinction, did assume Bach and Harnish’s terms—probably by influence of 
Strawson (1964), Urmson (1977) or even Benveniste (1974:271 f).  
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all? Is “unintentional” like “weird” or like “false”? The position that I will defend 
is the former one: unintentional speech acts are, in general, a kind of speech act, no 
matter how weird or marginal they are; for this reason, the adjective 
“unintentional”, in most cases, works as a specification of the type of act that took 
place, and not as an invalidation of the act itself. 
 
 
3. Unintentional speech acts 
 
The aforementioned idea might seem to run counter to most of the alternatives in 
speech acts theory, which, as Harnish shows, usually claim that speech acts are 
constitutively the result of conscious intentional states. But this general assumption 
is in clear contradiction with the use of language in ordinary life, where one can 
easily find the following cases: 
 
(1)  I apologise: I didn’t intend to insult you. 
(2)  My goodness, I wasn’t aware that we were voting his proposal! 
(3)  I didn’t realise then that, by saying so, I was offering them my house. 
(4)  But that is what you have just said! —Did I? Oh, I am sorry: I wasn’t paying 
attention. 
 
Those excuses qualify the preceding speech acts as defective in different respects, 
but neither of them denies that the act took place, which would be a different point. 
In each one of these cases, the change in the normative context is effective: the 
speakers did insult, vote, invite or assert by means of their previous utterances, 
which belonged to different kinds of unintentional speech acts. If that were not the 
case, excuses would have missed the point, since the preceding utterances would 
not require ‘excuses’, but ‘explanations’. For instance, along the following lines: 
 
(5)  I’m afraid that you are wrong: I did not insult you. 
(6)  It was certainly not his proposal that I voted. 
(7)  They are acting as if I had offered them my house, which I never did. 
(8)  That is not what I said: I was meaning something else.  
 
The difference between an intended and an unintended speech act is not that the 
former took place, whereas the latter did not. The latter did take place: 
unintentional speech acts are a kind of speech acts. They might be weird or 
marginal, but they are not false speech acts. Being the causal effect of specific 
mental states cannot thus be a necessary condition for an utterance to be a speech 
act. 
It is also important to note that the effective performance of the act does not 
merely rely on the uptake by the audience. Not just any uptake is valid or justified: 
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the hearer might have misunderstood the utterance, or she might have ignored a 
significant aspect of the context. The question is not that the uptake itself makes 
the utterance a speech act, but that the uptake might be justified beyond the 
speaker’s original intention: in the end, it might be the case that the hearer is 
correct about the kind of speech act that the speaker performed, despite the 
speaker’s own opinion. In fact, it is an essential aspect of speech acts that their 
effective performance does not only rely on the alleged intentions of the speaker. 
I did not step less strongly on somebody else’s foot just because I did it 
unintentionally, nor did I cause her less pain. By the same token, whether my vote, 
my acceptance of a proposal, or my invitation were committing speech acts or not 
cannot strictly depend on their hidden origin in my psychological states. Of course, 
I could give excuses to try to make this commitment less strong, but those cannot 
simply rely on the causal role performed by my intention in the coming about of 
the utterance. Excuses will have to point out to something the hearer could take as 
a good reason to believe that my action was unintended. If I cannot offer those 
good reasons, and my act leaves no room for ambiguities, it is impossible for me to 
excuse it by simply pointing to an alleged lack of intention7.  
I will say something about the nature of those “good reasons” in section 5. But 
before that, I will try to show that the acceptance of unintentional speech acts as 
fully committing speech acts is consistent with an explanation of ordinary speech 
acts as the causal effect of internal mental states. What makes a particular speech 
act a speech act is one question; what is its causal history is a different one. 
 
 
4. Usual causes do not have to be necessary conditions 
 
A denial of the role of mental states in the performance of speech acts would 
commit me to some kind of behaviourism, even to eliminativism, or at least to the 
abandonment of folk psychological concepts in the explanation of language use. 
But I am not defending this. It is not my intention to deny the role of internal states 
in the effective performance of utterances, or that utterances are usually caused by 
the internal states of the speakers. My point is that such causal connections are not 
necessary conditions for the utterance to be a fully committing speech act. One 
                                                
7 There is of course an important difference between excusing an act by saying that it was 
fully unintended (done with no intention at all), and excusing it by saying that it was the 
unintended consequence of an intended action. But both cases seem to be equally excluded 
by those who consider that speech acts must constitutively be the effect of intentions, since 
in their view the act must be directly caused by the specified intention. 
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thing is to understand how and why are speech acts usually performed (what are 
the ordinary causes of the utterances that we consider speech acts) and a very 
different one to explain what makes an utterance a speech act in general.  
Let me make this point clear with another example: punts are flat-bottomed 
shallow boats propelled by means of a long pole thrust. They are usually made of 
wood, but being made of wood is not a necessary condition for being a punt. A 
plastic punt would not be false punt but a kind of punt, although quite a rare, 
uncommon—and ugly—one. If we wished to propose a ‘punt theory’, and make 
explicit the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a punt, it would 
not be advisable to introduce as a requirement that they must be made out of wood. 
However, by excluding this as a condition we would not be denying (9) or (10):  
 
(9)  Punts are usually made of wood. 
(10)  Punts float because they are made of wood. 
 
In a similar way, speech acts are usually caused by intentional conscious mental 
states but, just as any other kind of action, they can also be performed 
unintentionally, absentmindedly or by mistake. These “extenuating circumstances” 
make different kinds of excuses pertinent, and those might in the end reduce the 
normative implications of the speech act, or even make them disappear. But these 
excuses do not change what happened, nor can they prevent the act from having 
taken place, just like my unintended stamp does not suddenly disappear from the 
past just because I beg my pardon to the person who’s foot I stepped on. I did step 
on her foot, although I did it unintentionally; I might be excused for that reason, 
but my excuses do not make the act vanish. Nor do they turn it into a mere event, 
like the falling of a stone, in which case I would have nothing to apologise for. 
Both the unintended stamp and the unintended speech act are something I did, 
although I was having a different intention, or no intention at all. For this reason, 
unintentional speech acts are a kind of speech acts; they are not something that 
only appeared to be a speech act, and finally was not, like the false doctor or the 
false oasis. It is a legitimate category, not the effect of rejection in a process of 
categorization. Now, just like ‘punt theory’ ought not make any reference to wood 
as a necessary condition for something to be a punt, and that would not force the 
‘punt theoretician’ to deny (9) or (10), speech acts theorists ought not consider 
intentions as necessary conditions, and this would not force them to deny (11) or 
(12): 
 
(11)  Speech acts are usually the effect of mental states. 
(12)  Speech acts usually work because they are the effect of mental states. 
 
However, the link between speech acts and mental states is more essential than the 
one between punts and wood. The latter is a historical and circumstantial relation, 
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whereas it seems that the former, as we will now see, is somehow constitutive, or 
even logical.  
 
 
5. Criteria as logically good—but not unappealable—reasons 
 
In order to defend the possibility of unintentional speech acts I would like to 
introduce a conceptual distinction inspired in Wittgenstein (2009) between logical 
entailment, symptoms and criteria, as three different reasons to infer from the 
patent manifestation of an event p the occurrence of another one, q8: 
(a) Logical entailment, needless to say, is an a priori judgement—i.e. true by 
definition—that links a particular phenomenon with a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions: if p has taken place, and p logically entails q, then q must 
have taken place. Of course, we can change the conventions that are in the basis of 
logical entailments, since any definition might be subject to further revisions; but 
as long as the definition is accepted, logical entailment is strictly necessary.  
(b) Symptomatic induction is the effect of an a posteriori hypothesis by which 
we take p as an empirically good evidence for the occurrence of q: if p has taken 
place, and p is a symptom of q, then q has probably taken place. This is a piece of 
inductive evidence, inferred from previous experiences, and usually based on 
hypothetical causal connections.9  
(c) Criterial attribution is a logically good—but not definitive or 
unappealable—type of evidence for the occurrence of a phenomenon. In general, 
when p has taken place, that means that q has taken place. Unlike symptoms, 
criteria are not based on mere hypothetical generalisations from previous 
experiences: p is not a criterion of q because of empirically observed correlations, 
but because q is somehow logically related to p. It is thus a constitutive 
connection—or, as Wittgenstein used to say, a grammatical question (2009: §353). 
                                                
8 Some scholars consider this distinction decisive to understand Wittgenstein’s work—see 
(Baker and Hacker 1984:110-5) or (Hacker 1990:545-68)—, whereas others dismiss it as 
inessential (Hanfling 1989:118-26). In any case, it is not a constant in Wittgenstein’s 
production, since the idea of criterion that he uses in 1929 is very different from the one that 
we find in the Blue Book, and both differ importantly from the version of the Philosophical 
Investigations. It is this final version that I will use here, according to Hacker’s (1990) 
reading of it. However, I am not particularly concerned here with the exegesis of 
Wittgenstein, and in what follows I will only instrumentally make use of these concepts. 
9 The symptomatic connection does not have to be causal, at least not in a straight way. For 
instance, even if p is a good symptom of q, q does not have to be p’s cause. They could 
usually happen together for another reason—e.g., because they share a common cause, r.  
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However, unlike logical entailment, criterial attributions are fallible in principle: 
even if p is a criterion for q, it could be the case that p, but not q. Like logical 
entailment, criteria are internal conceptual relationships; but, like symptoms, their 
relation is contingent, at least in particular occasions.  
The limits between these three categories are blurred, even in scientific 
discourse. In particular, as Wittgenstein himself remarked, “The fluctuation in 
grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at 
all but symptoms” (2009: §354). The fact is that, at first sight, both concepts seem 
to play a similar role: in contrast to logical entailment, neither symptoms nor 
criteria identify p with q, and both can fail. However, it should not be neglected 
that criteria, in contrast to symptoms, are not susceptible to failure because of the 
fallibility of our empirical generalisations. It is not the fallible character of our 
empirical inductions what makes criteria occasionally deceitful, since they are 
simply not based on inductions at all: they are assumed a priori, as meaningfulness 
conditions of our actions.  
The classic example for this is Wittgenstein’s account of pain: pain behaviour 
does not logically entail pain, nor does pain entail pain behaviour—since it is 
perfectly coherent to find the one in absence of the other—but, at least according to 
some views, it would be misleading to consider it as a mere symptom of pain, since 
our use of the word pain and its cognates, and even our understanding of the 
concept itself is tied to the public situations where pain behaviour is manifest. 
There is a peculiarity of criteria that makes the contrast with symptoms quite 
evident. If p is a criterion of q, and p is accomplished in a particular situation up to 
a certain point, it makes no sense even to ask about the occurrence of q. E.g., if 
somebody had fallen from a second floor and were lying on the ground with an 
open fractured leg screaming in pain, it would not make any sense whatsoever to 
ask “But is he really in pain?”. The correct response to such an sceptic inquiry 
would not be “How could you possibly doubt that?”, but “What in the world do 
you mean?”. Sceptics about other minds would try to claim that we could only see 
this man’s behaviour, but not pain itself, whose existence could only be inferred 
from the observance of behavioural evidence, and thus will always remain 
hypothetical. But this attitude would only make sense if we were talking about 
symptoms, which are empirically and hypothetically linked to whatever they are a 
symptom of. If pain behaviour were just a mere symptom of pain, it would always 
be possible to remain sceptic about the necessity of the conclusion. But if it is a 
matter of criteria, such kind of scepticism would only lead to a meaningless use of 
language, since the sceptic would be trying to make use of an expression 
completely detached from any social language game that could make it 
understandable and functional. Pain behaviour is not pain itself, since their relation 
is not of logical entailment, but under extreme conditions it does not make any 
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sense whatsoever to doubt about the occurrence of pain. In other words: we see 
pain in pain behaviour, we do not infer it from it.  
However, the appearance of further contextual evidence could always open the 
way to meaningful scepticism. Imagine for instance that, in the previous example, 
without realising it, we had got into some scenery where a film were being 
recorded. The screaming man on the ground would be an actor, and his broken leg 
a highly lifelike special effect. In that case, the space for sensible scepticism would 
be reopen. But under those conditions the question “What in the world do you 
mean?” would have quite an easy answer: the sceptic would only have to point to 
the cameras, the director, or the limits of the stage. However, the fact that a further 
widening of context would allow us to reconsider criterial attribution does not 
entail that, in the previous situation, we were making any kind of fallible inference, 
which would have later been proved to be wrong. There was no such inference on 
empirical hypothetical grounds, since we were not judging on symptoms, but just 
acting in accordance to criteria that are constitutive of our concepts.  
 
 
6. Austin’s “implication” as limited entailment—and why the 
notion of criterion is a better one 
 
It might be helpful to approach Austin’s work with those concepts in mind, in 
particular the moment when he struggles to find out what connection there is 
between speech acts and mental states. The necessity of this kind of connections is 
manifested in what Wittgenstein (2009: II, x, §87) had famously called “Moore’s 
paradox”: it is somehow odd to say something like “p but I do not believe that p”. 
However, there is nothing logically incoherent between p and somebody not 
believing that p is the case (i.e. somebody being wrong), or between somebody not 
believing p but, at the same time, asserting p (i.e. somebody lying). Those are not 
logical contradictions at all. Moore’s paradox does not emerge from the semantic 
content of the sentence, but from its pragmatic performance, when the speaker both 
asserts p and denies that she has the correlative belief. She is not just not expected 
to do that, but somehow not allowed to do it, because her assertion and her belief 
should be accord.  
The scope of this kind of paradoxes is both more extended and more restricted 
than it was at first thought. On the one hand, it can be extended to other kinds of 
propositional attitudes and speech acts (whenever a speaker requires something, 
she is expected to desire it; whenever she promises something, she is expected to 
have the intention to accomplish it, and so on), and some authors have even 
extended it to unasserted mental states (an agent could not both believe that p is the 
case and that it is also the case that she does not believe it herself). On the other 
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hand, as Tsohatzidis (1994) has shown, there can be exceptions to any of those 
cases.  
Moore’s paradoxes show that there is some connection between the speech act 
performed by the speaker and the content of her mental states. Austin calls this 
kind of inference an “implication” (1962: 47-52). Now the problem is: what 
exactly is an “implication”? Lacking from the concept of criterion, Austin seems to 
be equally unsatisfied both by logical deduction and symptomatic induction as 
models to understand implications. He correctly points out that we are not facing 
here any kind of logical “entailment”, because such an entailment ought to take 
place between the propositions that composed the assertion, and they are, as we 
have seen, perfectly compatible with each other. Besides, an implication must be 
weaker than entailment, since it can be wrong without strict logical contradiction.  
While the problem with entailment is that it introduces a too tight requirement, 
the problem with symptomatic induction is that it is too loose, since such an 
account of implications would merely point to contingent and probably causal 
connections between them. When we find somebody asserting p, we have a good 
reason to ascribe to her the believe that p; but the reason is not that we have found 
this correlation in our linguistic community. There is something somehow 
unexpected in the occurrence of a symptom in absence of the illness it is a 
symptom of, or of an illness in absence of its alleged symptoms, but that 
strangeness has nothing to do with the one that we experience when we face 
Moore’s cases. The oddity of Moore’s cases does not stem from a break of 
expectations based on empirical regularities—like that people usually believe what 
they assert, and those beliefs are usually the cause of their assertions. Unlike 
failing symptoms, Moore’s cases are the effect of a breach of inner conceptual 
connections10. 
Furthermore, if speech acts were just an external and causal manifestation of 
inner mental states—i.e. their symptoms—there would be no way to prevent bad 
faith speakers from denying the normative implications of their actions. Austin 
exemplifies this with the case of Euripides’ Hippolytus, who famously denied to be 
attached to his promise, excusing himself with the words: My tongue an oath did 
take, but not my heart (I, 612. Trans. Coleridge). 
If the causal role accomplished by mental states were a necessary condition for 
the performance of a speech act, the very existence of the act and its effects would 
strictly depend on the occurrence of such mental state. In that case, nothing would 
                                                
10 For similar reasons, Grice (1989:42) refused to give an account of Moore’s paradox as an 
effect of conversational implicatures. As Harnish (1977:370-1) points out, Moore-type 
sentences would precisely be unsuccessful attempts to cancel such alleged implicature. 
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prevent the cunning speaker from escaping his duties, since intentions, considered 
as inner hidden states, cannot in principle be ever present in the public scene. An 
illocutionary act, like a promise or a request, must not rely on the hidden 
performance of an invisible heart, “or mind or other backstage artist” (Austin 1962: 
9-10), and does thus not consist in the outer manifestation of such an inner state. 
Hippolytus “does promise: the promise here is not even void, though it is given in 
bad faith. His utterance is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtless 
wrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement” (1962: 11). Word is our bound, not 
inner commitments, or the effective existence of the implied mental state. The 
utterance is not a speech act because it is the contingent causal manifestation of an 
inner act, a mere symptom of thought: the utterance is the act itself.11 By the same 
token, a speaker’s assertion that p is not just a good symptom of her belief that p: 
the assertion somehow means that the speaker believes what she says. In saying the 
words, she asserted; in asserting, she manifested her beliefs. 
Lacking from the concept of criterion, and equally unsatisfied both by logical 
entailment and symptomatic induction, Austin had to look somewhere else for an 
alternative model for implications. He thus proposed a revised notion of logical 
entailment: it must somehow be the case—at least under certain circumstances—
that the utterance necessarily is a speech act, and the speech act necessarily implies 
the mental states we expect from it. Austin had thus to appeal to what he called 
normal conditions, restricting the logical entailment of utterances and illocutionary 
acts to those particular cases. Not just any word utterance by itself entails the 
performance of illocutionary acts; but word utterance under “normal conditions” 
do entail the intentional states they express, and thus do lead to the performance of 
fully-fledged speech acts. 
It is now important to realise that the model proposed by Austin is not the one 
of criterion, as it has been described in the previous section, but the one of a 
restricted logical entailment whose antecedent has been increased by the addition 
of further requirements. I.e., Austin substitutes 
 
 p → q 
for  
(p & r & s & …)→ q 
                                                
11 N.B.: when Austin was asked by Chaim Perelman for the need of a meta or extra-
linguistic criterion for the performative after a lecture he delivered in France in 1958, he 
denied that it must be some kind of “sentiment intérieur”. See (Béra 1962:271-304), and 
(Maclean 2004:52).  
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In this way, the utterance of p would be just one of the conditions for the fully 
effective speech act, and an indefinite number of other contextual conditions (r, s, 
and so on) would also be requisites for the entitlement to be strictly necessary. 
Those conditions would constitute what Austin famously called “the total speech 
act in the total speech situation” (1962: 53).  
Austin himself was aware that the idea of normality is extremely vague, since 
we seem to be forced to consider rehearsals, soliloquies, ironies, metaphors, or 
quotations as ‘abnormal’ uses, despite their ubiquity in ordinary language.12 We do 
not seem to be able to define what we consider “normal” conditions, but through 
an enumeration of allegedly ‘abnormal’ situations. The problem then is that, unless 
we are given an intensional notion of normality, we are not sure how to follow that 
extensional enumeration of ‘abnormalities’. And, in any case, it cannot be denied 
that somebody under really weird and abnormal conditions could still try to make a 
perfectly ‘normal’, ‘serious’ and ‘literal’ speech act. 
In an effort to prevent Hippolytus from escaping his duties, Austin tends to 
heavily rely on the notion of convention: where a clear convention pre-exists the 
speech act, and the performance fits that convention, the act is fully performed 
whether the speaker has the implied mental state or not. Conventions would thus 
link a set of performance conditions with particular illocutionary effects, 
overcoming the problem of concomitant mental states. E.g., if a judge is dressed in 
a certain way, in front of a certain audience at a certain moment, and utters the 
words “I find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree” he is actually 
performing the speech act of declaring the accused guilty, quite independently of 
his alleged intention. However, it has been convincingly shown—at least since 
Strawson (1964)—that the notion of convention is highly problematic, at least for 
two reasons: first, it is much more restricted than the idea of speech act, and could 
thus hardly give a full account of it; in general, conventions as such only seem to 
play a crucial role in quite rigid, ceremonial or ritual acts (Bach and Harnish 1979: 
55). Second, even when a convention can be invoked, that does not seem by itself 
                                                
12 In Harnish’s (2005:21) expression, “None of these activities are non-normal in any normal 
sense of ‘normal’.” This is the reason he gives to reject Kemmerling (2002) notion of “cp-
analytical evidence”, which might seem close to the one of criterion proposed here. 
Kemmerling is searching indeed for a concept that could accomplish the role here attributed 
to criteria, between mere symptoms and unappealable entailments. However, his appeal to 
“normality”, as Harnish points out, makes the proposal collapse again into “something 
empirical”.  
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to solve the difficulties it was expected to solve, since conventions are not self 
interpreting entities (Sperber and Wilson 1986).13 
In contrast to conventions—whether implicit or explicit—criteria seem to be 
less limited in its scope. For instance: in the aforementioned example of the person 
screaming with an open fracture, I really cannot think of any notion of convention 
that could justify there the alleged ‘inference’ by the part of the observer as to the 
pain of the observed person. Being aware of the pain of the other, and being prone 
to help her in this situation, is simply the immediate and correct way to react. 
There would be no convention sustaining an inference as to the mental states of the 
other, and no theoretical premise in any ‘theory of mind’, but just direct perception 
of her situation, and response in accordance to that perception. This same idea 
could be extended from primitive actions and meanings, such as pain behaviour, to 
complex acts mediated by linguistic structures. As far as the hearer is a competent 
user of the language, the utterances that she hears are direct expressions of the 
intentions of the speaker. If somebody asserts p under a particular situation, what 
we see is that she believes that p is the case: we do not need to appeal to 
conventions or inferences.14 
To sum up, the problem with Austin’s explanation of Moore’s paradox is that 
he tries to understand the “implication” between speech act and intentional state as 
a weakened sort of logical entailment, where the antecedent conditions would have 
been indefinitely extended. But such an entailment is hard to understand, unless we 
can clearly delimit the conditions that ought to appear in the antecedent. As far as 
there is an open antecedent, there is always the possibility of a failure in the 
entailment, and thus, strictly speaking, no such entailment. This would leave the 
door open to Hippolytus, since it would always be up to him to deny that the 
conditions were fulfilled, and thus that he should keep his own words. Appealing 
to conventions would not solve the problem, since conventions—at least conceived 
as means for the action—are much more limited than speech acts and, in any case, 
                                                
13 Sbisà has tried to defend the original Austinian position by claiming that what is 
conventional in the performance of speech acts is not their means, or at least not necessarily, 
but their ends, that is, what is done in them (Sbisà 2009:43). I am sympathetic with Sbisà’s 
attempt, but I am inclined to believe that criterion is a more effective notion than 
convention, in order to attain the same goals, namely, making speech acts purely rely on the 
‘external’ conditions of the performance. 
14 There is an obvious resemblance between this idea and the Gricean agenda to get from 
“natural” to “non-natural” linguistic meaning (Grice 1989:292), but those are not the 
categories I am using here. It seems to me that Grice’s decision to define linguistic meaning 
in terms of intention to induce beliefs by the recognition of that same intention would also 
be pushing unintended acts out of the category of communicative actions.  
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7. Searle’s “expression” and the sincerity condition 
 
Searle’s (1969) combination of conventions and intentions in the conditions for the 
performance of speech acts turns his proposal into one of the most ‘mixed’ cases in 
Harnish’s categorization. With respect to the crucial question proposed at the 
beginning of this paper, Searle seems to assume that it is a sine qua non condition 
for the performance of the act it to be the result of a quite specific set of intentional 
states15. In particular, the sixth of his conditions, the famous “sincerity condition”, 
involves the conscious entertainment by the part of the speaker of a specific 
psychological state. For instance, for promises, he claims that: 
 
6. S intends to do A.16  
 
is a condition for the act to be sincerely performed. Similar requirements would be 
introduced for assertions (S believes p), petitions (S desires the hearer to do A), 
and so on. Cases like Hippolytus’ one, who denies to have had the concomitant 
intention while his ‘tongue’ was apparently uttering the oath, are solved by Searle 
by transforming this condition, assuming that sincerity itself is not a requirement 
for the act to be performed. However, his transformation still preserves the 
structure of an intentional attribution:  
 
6a. S intends that the utterance of T will make him responsible for intending to 
do A.17  
 
                                                
15 It is difficult to say if Searle would consider this as a requirement for each and every 
speech act, since he explicitly confines his theory “to the center of the concept of 
promising”, deliberately “ignoring marginal, fringe, and partially defective promises” 
(Searle 1969:55). In so doing, he follows Austin’s methodological exclusion of infelicities, 
and exposes himself to the kind of confusions pointed out in section 2. This move was 
famously denounced by Derrida (1988)—see (Navarro-Reyes 2010). Derrida also defended 
there the need to reconsider the role of intentions in speech acts, in a way that is not very 
different from the one here proposed. 
16 Where S stands for Speaker and A for a future Act. 
17 Where T stands for some sentence or similar stretch of discourse. 
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Even if the speaker does not have the intention to fulfil his promise, his utterance is 
a committing speech act because he has the intention that his utterance will make 
him responsible for having that intention. This is, according to Searle, the effect of 
a law that governs speech acts in general: 
 
Wherever there is a psychological state specified in the sincerity condition, the 
performance of the act counts as an expression of that psychological state. This law 
holds whether the act is sincere or insincere, that is whether the speaker actually has 
the specified psychological state or not (Searle 1969: 65).  
 
It does not matter for the very performance of the act if the subject is in the alleged 
psychological state or not: his words count as an expression of that state, and that 
fact bounds him to them. In contrast to Austin, Searle, following Grice in this, 
prefers to reserve the word “imply” for what he calls “preparatory conditions”, 
such as that, in a promise, the hearer would prefer the act to be performed—quite 
the opposite of threads—, or that it is not obvious that the speaker was going to 
perform it anyway—since that would make the promise pointless, or even 
counterproductive. What is implied in the speech act is what gives it a point, 
something different in Searle’s account from what is expressed in the act, that is, 
the mental state that can be expected from the speaker.  
Some authors (Malcolm 1991: 160; Marmor 2009: 124), tend to understand the 
verb “express” in a factive sense, and that assumption prevents them from correctly 
understanding Searle’s account. A factive use of “express” would imply that the 
speaker effectively has the state she expressed in her words, and this would make 
insincere speech acts impossible: if having the state were a condition for the act, 
the lack of intention in a promise (of belief in an assertion, and so on), would 
prevent the very act from coming to existence. Nevertheless, that is not what Searle 
has in mind when he uses the concept of “expression”: a speaker can perfectly 
“express” a mental state that she does not have. Effectively having the state is not a 
condition for the act to take place, but only for its sincere performance. 
 
 
8. What would Hippolytus deny? 
 
There is one way of understanding Searle’s transformation of the sincerity 
condition that turns it into a pointless move: the problem with the first version of 
the sincerity condition was that it introduced a ‘hidden’ condition for the 
performance of the act, something that never takes place in the social scene of the 
utterance: the inner intentional attitude. This left the door open to bad faith 
speakers like Hippolytus to claim that they did not actually perform speech acts at 
all, since they were not in the concomitant state. Searle’s revised version of the 
sincerity condition is supposed to solve this but, if we understand 6a as establishing 
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an additional internal commitment, this step clearly fails18. Searle’s revision of his 
own sincerity condition would not be successful, since it would not prevent 
Hippolytus from escaping his duties. The reason is that both 6 and 6a would 
require an intention by the part of the speaker that could be denied by Hippolytus: 
just like he refused to be bound by his promise because he did not have the 
intention to do A, he could also refuse to be bound by his promise because he did 
not have the intention to make himself responsible for intending to do A. It would 
just be a more complex claim to do, but the possibility of making it would not have 
changed in any relevant way. 
A weak interpretation of Hippolytus’ excuse would construe him as denying 6, 
that is, that he had the intention to perform the promised action. But one can image 
a stronger bad faith by his part: he could not be denying that he had the intention to 
fulfil his promise, but that he had the intention to make the promise. He would not 
be claiming that his utterance was an insincere promise, but denying that his 
utterance was a promise at all. There are two senses in which a promise can lack 
the concomitant intentions: 
 
(13)  ‘I promise’, said when the speaker does not intend to do what she promises. 
(14)  ‘I promise’, said with no intention to promise. 
 
By claiming that it was only his tongue, but not his heart, who did that oath, 
Hippolytus does not seem to mean (13), which is what Searle’s revision of the 
sincerity condition would preclude, but (14). He would be saying that he was not 
intending to create with his words the alleged bound—not just that he did not 
intend to respect the bound he was creating. Hippolytus would not be denying 6, 
but 6a. This might appear as a philosophically sophisticated example, but the case 
is not so weird as one could expect. In fact, in our ordinary lives we meet almost 
every day people who fishily deny having talked seriously when they said 
something, or having said it intentionally, or having been aware of the implications 
of their words. Hippolytus is not just a speculative case: preventing people of his 
sort from escaping his duties is one of the most important aims of linguistic 
practices. 
Now, the problem cannot be solved with a merely symptomatic approach to 
“expression”: if by saying that an utterance expresses an intention, we are just 
making an empirical hypothesis as to its causal psychological precedent, there is no 
                                                
18 Alston is exposed to the same kind of criticism when he claims that the speech act’s 
committing character depends on the speaker’s act of “taking responsibility” for her words 
(2000: 54).  
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way to close the escape to Hippolytus, and no way to prevent the performance of 
the speech act from being, in the end, just a sort of ‘internal act’ contingently 
manifested in the social world. If “expression” were a merely symptomatic notion, 
there would be no reason why the revised sincerity condition would succeed where 
the original one failed. Hippolytus could still say that his utterance was not 
binding, because he did not intend to take the responsibility for it being the case 
that he had that intentional state. Nothing substantial changes if we just replace a 
first order intention for a second order one in our requisites. 
I can only see two options here: whether we preserve intentions such as 6a as 
necessary conditions (and we must thus give an account of a factive use of 
“expression”) or we simply take intentions out of our requirements. In the first 
option, by making a promise, the speaker would be “expressing”, in a non-factive 
sense, the intention to fulfil it, but he would be “expressing”, in a factive sense, his 
intention to make the promise, since otherwise there would be no promise at all, 
and Hippolytus would not be bound by his words. But finding an account of the 
factive use of “expression” does not seem to be an easy task. Why does that 
intention have to be effectively present? By proposing a factive use of “express” 
we would be trying to understand the relationship between utterance and intention 
as logical implication and, as we have seen with Austin, this does not work. We get 
back to Austin’s original problem, since the utterance by itself does not seem 
logically to entail any mental state, and neither does the utterance plus its context, 
unless we introduce in the context the intentional state itself—and by doing so we 
would be begging the question19. 
That leaves us with the second option: taking intentions out of our 
requirements. And that is the step I propose to take: we will not preclude bad faith 
speakers from denying their commitments by transforming the sincerity condition 
into a more complex second order intention, but by clearly formulating the way in 
which responsibility stems from words and deeds, not from the alleged intentions 
that generated them. Responsibility does not arise from the actual intentional state 
of the speaker (whether it is a first or a second order one), but from the fact that her 
                                                
19 According to Searle (1989: 556), the self-guaranteeing character of performatives would 
be explained because “as far as illocutionary force is concerned the speaker cannot lie or be 
mistaken: assuming the other conditions on the speech act are satisfied, if he intends his 
utterance to have the force of an order, then it has that force; because the manifested 
intention is constitutive of that force” (my emphasis). What I am claiming here is that 
Hippolytus could simply deny that the subordinate clause of that conditional is a correct 
description of the situation. Moya’s account of “meaningful actions”—as those that 
necessarily imply the intention to be performed—would be exposed to similar criticism, 
unless “intention” is assumed in a criterial way (Moya 1990: ch. IV).  
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utterance is—in the sense that it counts as—an expression of the state. And that 
idea of “expression” should clearly not be understood as an act of will, by which 
the relevant intention causes the utterance—that would thus be its symptom—, but 
by the sort of criterial requirements that the utterance accomplishes. In contrast to 
the symptomatic sense of “expression”, the criterial one does not rely on the 
purportedly causal connection between utterance and mental state, but on the 
conceptual connection that allows us to say that a particular pattern of behaviour 
counts as an expression of a specific psychological state. That criterial relation is 
not up to the speaker, since it is simply not the consequence of any act of his will. 
 
 
9. Expressibility is not enough 
 
The problem with Searle is that there is some sort of ambiguity in his theory, since 
in some cases we find the notion of “expression” as pointing to a symptomatic and 
causal connection, and sometimes we find it as a basis for criterial attribution. In 
other words: sometimes Searle considers that it is a condition of the speech act that 
the speaker intends to express the mental state indicated in the revised sincerity 
condition (which would make of the expression a symptom causally related to its 
cause, the mental state), and sometimes he describes the utterance itself as a fact 
that counts as an expression of the concomitant mental state. But the idea that the 
utterance itself “counts as” an expression of the mental state does not point to any 
intended or voluntary action by the part of the speaker (his act of expressing), or to 
a causal connection between the mental state and the utterance, but to a 
grammatical or logical relation between the expression and the situation in which 
the audience attributes mental state predicates.  
Searle talks about “expression” indifferently as a voluntary act by the part of 
the speaker (S expresses the attitude) and as a criterial attribution by the part of the 
audience (the utterance counts as such an attitude). But both ideas are quite 
different in kind, each one of them leading to different conceptions of the link 
between mental states and utterances.20 However, I wouldn’t say that Searle’s 
ambiguity in the use of “expression” is the unpremeditated effect of a lack of 
attention. He makes use of both senses indifferently because he considers that they 
                                                
20 The symptomatic sense can be found in Bach and Harnish when they claim that “For S to 
express an attitude is for S to [reflexively] intend the hearer to take S’s utterance as a reason 
to think S has that attitude” (1979:15). The criterial sense would point to the utterance itself, 
and the way in which it gives the hearer good reasons to attribute to the speaker the alleged 
attitude. 
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can somehow be, not just compatible, but interchangeable. He explicitly makes that 
assumption since the beginning of Speech Acts (1969: 16), by establishing the 
Principle of Expressibility, according to which “whatever can be meant can be 
said”. The possibilities of any intended expression by the part of the speaker as a 
voluntary act would be equal to the possibilities of criterial attribution by her target 
audience. Paraphrased, the Principle of Expressibility would guarantee that, at least 
de iure, for any mental estate the speaker might want to express (in a symptomatic 
sense), there is—or could be—a possible utterance that would express such estate 
(in a criterial sense). That is: for every meaning that the speaker might intend to 
communicate, there is a sentence whose meaning does the job. 
However, even if this Principle were sound—and I have expressed somewhere 
else my doubts that it could be supported without some substantial qualifications 
(Navarro-Reyes 2009)—, it would only grant the possibility of that accordance 
between speaker meaning and sentence meaning, but not its necessity. It would 
only show that the speaker could choose ways to express her attitudes that would 
count as an expression of such attitudes for her audience, but it does not show that 
whenever she makes use of that ways of expression—ways that are criterially 
related to the mental attitude—she must effectively intend to perform the alleged 
speech act. The Principle of Expressibility only claims that the symptomatic sense 
of ‘expression’ and the criterial sense can match, but it does not force the speaker 
to make them match in any particular situation.21 If their matching is a matter of 
inner commitment, that is, of having the alleged mental state as the effective cause 
of the utterance, Hippolytus is still free to deny it. 
That is why Searle’s account of speech acts must rely on conventions up to a 
point that some have considered disproportionate. If the speaker intends to perform 
a speech act, she has to use means that are previously considered by the 
community as basis for the attribution of mental states and illocutionary intentions, 
since the speech act could only work under the assumption that there is some 
previously shared common knowledge and awareness that such and such piece of 
behaviour ‘count as’ an expression of such and such mental state. Every act must 
somehow be guaranteed by a convention that works as its vehicle, since otherwise 
the possibilities of the speaker to express her attitudes would not correspond to the 
expectations of her audience. If the act were not guaranteed by a convention, we 
                                                
21 Furthermore, neither does it force the audience to make them match. It could be the case, 
for instance, that all criterial reasons to attribute an intentional state were fulfilled, but the 
audience were justified to deny the occurrence of the corresponding mental state, and would 
thus not take the alleged expressions as ‘counting as’ anything at all. A good example is 
Searle’s (1980) Chinese room argument. 
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could not be sure of what it means to say that the speaker expresses the attitude, 
since there would be nothing previously considered as a basis for the attitude 
attribution. 
However, we have seen with Austin that conventions do not do the job, since 
they can only justify indefinitely limited entitlements, not being in any case a 
guarantee for the factive use of “express”. In contrast to this, criterial uses of 
“express” are definitively not factive—just like criterial attributions are not logical 
entailments. Neither are they merely symptomatic inductions, since judging on 
criteria is not making hypothesis as to hidden causes, based on empirical 
regularities. That is the reason why I claim that the only way to force Hippolytus to 
keep his word is by attaching his responsibility to his utterance as such, to the 
criterial conditions that it fulfils, and not to an alleged inner state that ought to be 
the cause of his utterance. And that is the main thesis of this paper: that it is not 
mental states that bind, or hidden intentions, but words and deeds. Responsibility 
does not stem from what we intend to mean, but from what we actually say, quite 





I am not claiming that we ought to exclude intentions from our consideration of 
speech acts. Nor am I denying that beliefs, desires and intentions are generally the 
causes of those acts, or that they are effectively expressed in them. I am simply 
claiming that our consideration of an utterance as a speech act is not a symptomatic 
hypothesis as to the causal role performed by those states. When we claim that 
somebody made a speech act, we are not making empirical conjectures about the 
unseen origin of her words: we are describing what she did with them—whether 
intentionally or not. The price to be paid to force bad faith speakers to keep their 
                                                
22 Despite the scepticism that some scholars have shown about the convenience to introduce 
responsibility in an account of speech acts—vg, (Harnish 2005)—, I do think that it is a 
crucial concept, and I agree on this with Searle, and even with Alston. But I do not think that 
responsibility emerges from the speech act because it is the effect of a mental intention. We 
are made responsible for our words, not for the intentions that we had when we uttered 
them. We might find understanding in our audience if we allege that our act was 
unintended—or we might not find it; in any case, the very performance of the act that we are 
trying to excuse does not strictly depend on the intention that we had when we performed it. 
And that is precisely what gives our excuse a reason. 
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words is to detach the performance of the act from its alleged causal history in the 
mind of the speaker. 
I would like to finish with an important qualification: it only makes sense to say 
that somebody performed an unintentional speech act if that person is able in 
general to perform intentional speech acts. Unintentional speech acts are 
necessarily a marginal phenomenon, and could never be the rule. That is the reason 
why the link between speech acts and intentions is much stronger than the one 
between punts and wood: it is a constitutive one, not just circumstantial. However, 
although it is constitutive, it is contingent. That is the contribution of criteria, as 
logically good—but not unappealable—reasons, which are the basis of our 
practices: criteria whose conditions must all be external, just like the social world 
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